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The RTA referenced here is the Tenant Protection Act, 1997, S.O. 1997 c. 24 and section 3(a) referenced below is section 5(a) in the current version of the RTA
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
Putnam v. Grand River Conservation Authority (2006), 210 O.A.C. 291
8. Use: The Tenant shall occupy the Demised Premises on a
seasonal and temporary basis during the Term and any renewals
thereof for the purpose of personal recreational use only and for no other purpose….
 The Landlord submitted to the Tribunal that the lots rented to the Tenants fall within the
exceptions of s. 3(a) of the TPA, which reads as follows:
3.(a) This Act does not apply with respect to, (a) living accommodation intended to be provided to the travelling or vacationing public or occupied for a seasonal or temporary period in a hotel, motel or motor hotel, resort, lodge, tourist camp, cottage or cabin establishment, inn, campground, trailer park, tourist home, bed and breakfast vacation establishment or vacation home.
 The Tribunal’s analysis, which rejected the submission of the Landlord, is reported as follows:
The listing of places where this seasonal or temporary accommodation is to take place clearly is a listing of places, owned by private persons or businesses, which appeal to the general public as vacation spots or places to stay when one is away from home. They represent accommodation for travellers, for vacationers, for anyone who needs temporary accommodation provided by someone other than themselves.
The Tribunal accepts that the phrase ‘in a … cottage or cabin
establishment’ in Section 3(a) should be interpreted to mean that the grouping of cottages or cabins (the establishment) available as seasonal or temporary accommodation is analogous to the rooms in a hotel or a motel, or the rooms in a ‘bed and breakfast’ or in an inn, or the sites at a campground or in a trailer park, available as living accommodation to be occupied for a seasonal or temporary period. To interpret otherwise would be to ‘hive off’ this particular
phrase from the listing in Section 3(a) and give it a completely
different interpretation from the other words and phrases in the
. . .
The Tribunal’s interpretation of section 3(a) of the Act is an
interpretation based upon the listing of the areas of ‘living
accommodation … occupied for a seasonal or temporary period’.
That list contains only areas of accommodation that are owned or managed by a person or business offering the accommodation service.
To interpret ‘cottage or cabin establishment’ as something different from the other portions of the list is not an acceptable interpretation, nor logical. The plain reading of the list demands that this phrase be given an interpretation which makes it a part of the list, as opposed to one which makes it diametrically different from the other words and phrases in the listing.
Therefore, one is left with an exemption for living accommodation
occupied as a temporary or seasonal residence only if that
residence is part of the named and listed types of accommodation.
In this case, the Applicants clearly are temporary residents,
occupying their living accommodation from time-to-time, but
those residences are not part of a ‘cottage or cabin establishment’
that is analogous to a hotel, a motel, an inn, a ‘bed and breakfast’,
or a campground or trailer park.
 Earlier in these reasons, we noted that s. 27 (c) of the lease agreement made August 1,
1999, provided, in part:
This lease shall not be subject to the Tenant Protection Act, S.O. 1997, Chapter 24…
 Section 2(1) of the TPA provides, as follows:
2. (1) This Act applies with respect to rental units and residential complexes, despite any other Act and despite any agreement or waiver to the contrary. [emphasis added]
 Except as permitted by s. 181 of the TPA, discussed below, a landlord and tenant cannot
contract out of the TPA. The courts have prohibited contracting out even if it is for the benefit of
the tenant. (Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg,  O.J. No. 2683 (H.C.J.) at para. 18; Pallagrosi
v. Hrynyk,  O.J. No. 2683 (Gen. Div.) at paras. 15-17)
 In our view, that portion of s. 27(3) of the lease set out above was of no effect when the lease was signed.