LTB Decision – Luis Dos Santos v Green Acre RV Park – Order_SWT-68358-14- DissectedAdvice for the Mobile and Seasonal RV Campers

The information provided on this page is the personal opinion of the owner of this site and is not a legal opinion. If you need legal advice contact a lawyer

The purpose of the RTA appears to have been lost by the LTB and this was noted in the Mathews v Algoma Timberlake decision.

Purposes of Act (RTA)

From The RTA : The purposes of this Act are to provide protection for residential tenants from unlawful rent increases and unlawful evictions, to establish a framework for the regulation of residential rents, to balance the rights and responsibilities of residential landlords and tenants and to provide for the adjudication of disputes and for other processes to informally resolve disputes. 2006, c. 17, s. 1.
From Mathews v Algoma Timberlake : The purpose of the legislation is to provide protections to tenants. There is no reason to exclude tenants who have a penchant for recreation and spending time with their families in the outdoors. Indeed, if it had been the legislature’s intention to exclude recreational units from the Act, it could have added living accommodation occupied for “recreational” purposes to the s. 5 list of premises to which the Act does not apply.
There are definitions used below that were taken from Termium Plus, The Canadian Governments Terminology Database http://www.btb.termiumplus.gc.ca/tpv2alpha/alpha-eng.html?lang=eng
From Mathews: The Honourable R. Roy McMurtry, the Attorney General at the time, explained that the purpose behind extending the application of these protections to mobile homes (and later to land lease sites) was to provide tenants of those premises with security of tenure and other protections that had been available to other tenants. [See Note 3 below] To ensure that protection, the legislation provided a broad definition of a “rental unit”.
(a) Rental unit

[24] The definition of a “rental unit” in s. 2(1) contains two components. First, the unit must be “living accommodation”. Second, it must be used or intended for use as “rented residential premises”. As I have indicated, s. 3(1) provides that the Act applies despite any term in the lease to the contrary and s. 4 provides that “a provision in a tenancy agreement that is inconsistent with this Act or the regulations is void”. Section 202 requires the Board to “ascertain the real substance of the activities” relating to the rental unit and to do so disregarding “the outward form of [the] transaction”. Accordingly, a term in the lease providing that a site is not residential nor a rental unit will not have the effect of avoiding the application of the Act, provided that the premises otherwise fit within the statutory definition of a “rental unit”.

Statutory Definition of Rental Unit from the RTA

“rental unit” means any living accommodation used or intended for use as rented residential premises, and “rental unit” includes,

(a) a site for a mobile home or site on which there is a land lease home used or intended for use as rented residential premises

This definition has no conditional riders that would limit the effective meaning to recreational, seasonal or temporary period.

References:
Putnam v Grand River Conservation Authority
Mathews v Algoma Timberlake
Residential Tenancy Act

Louis Dos Santos v Emerald Acre Park, RV Park
File SWT-68358-14
Date Issued: 26 January 2015

LTB Member: Kevin Lundy

Factual Background
1. The .Applicant moved into the complex on July 5, 2013. He owns the ‘park model’ trailer and rents the space where it rests from the Respondent. He pays approximately $600.00 in monthly rent in addition to fees for hydro, propane and sewage provided by the park. The Respondent also charges Harmonized Sales Tax (H.S.T.) on the monthly rent. While the unit was once mobile, its wheels have since been removed and a skirt wrapped around the lower exterior according to photographs submitted at the hearing. The trailer currently rests on railway ties.

Typical definition of a land lease home in a land lease park.

“land lease home” means a dwelling, other than a mobile home, that is a permanent structure where the owner of the dwelling leases the land used or intended for use as the site for the dwelling;

This definition is absolute, with no conditions such as residential, seasonal, temporary period.

(4) A rented site for a mobile home or a land lease home is a rental unit for the purposes of this Act even if the mobile home or the land lease home on the site is owned by the tenant of the site. 2006, c. 17, s. 2 (4).

2. He maintains another permanent residence elsewhere for at least two months of the year as the park is closed between January 1 and March 1 every year. During that period, no one other than a caretaker member of the Respondent’s staff resides in the park. The entrance to the park is barred with a gate and several signs indicated that no entry is permitted during the closed season. Pass cards held by residents are rendered inoperative. Roads within the park are not constructed for residential use and facilities such as the outdoor pools and hot tubs, horse shoe pits, public washrooms and a meeting hall are closed and unavailable during the closed season from January 1 to March 1. While laundry facilities and the meeting hall are open during the “off-season‘ between October and the end of December, nothing is open during the subsequent “closed season.‘ Most importantly, water service to the units is discontinued during this period.

3. While it is possible for a resident to access the park during the closed season in the event of an emergency, they may only do so in the company of a staff member and with prior permission. No resident is permitted to spend the night in the park between January 1 and March 1 and the Respondent’s employees police the grounds to ensure compliance with this restriction. No day use is permitted.

4. While some residents only spend six months per year in the park, the Applicant typically resides there for ten months each year. The precise date that residents must leave can be somewhat ﬂexible under certain circumstances. For instance. in 2014, he did not leave until January 5, 2014 due to health complications. But for these exceptional circumstances, I ﬁnd based on the evidence that the Applicant would have been compelled to vacate the pant on or before January 1, 2014.

5. While the Applicant’s trailer is structurally capable of habitation during the winter, as the park is closed, the supply of hydro and propane is discontinued until the park reopens.

6. The Campsite Contract signed by the parties on July 9, 2013 clearly sets out the period during which the park is closed. The residents including the Applicant must provide the Respondent with a permanent address to ensure that that they are not using the park as a year round residence. Ail residents are advised upon entering into their contract with the park that they must vacate the park for a minimum of sixty consecutive days each year.

7. Similarly, the Applicant signed a winterizing service agreement with the Respondent on December 2, 2013 that sets out the fees for blowing out the pipes, draining water and other procedures for ensuring that the trailer will not be damaged by low temperatures during the winter months. On this contract, the Applicant must indicate the date that he expects to return to the unit. On the 2013 contract submitted at the hearing, the Applicant indicated that he would return to the park on March 3, 2014. The Applicant had a full opportunity to review these contracts prior to signing them and indicated a full comprehension of their implications at the hearing.

8. The park itself is subject to zoning By-law No. 05-70, from the City of Waterloo that limits residence in the park to seasonal use. Section 1 of the By-law requires that the park remain closed for at least sixty continuous days between October 31 and April 30 of the following year and that the park shall not include any permanent or year round residences.

9. B.M. was present when the Applicant reviewed the Rules including the By-laws prior to signing his contract with the park on July, 2013. B.M. testiﬁed that these restrictions have been in place without any changes since at least 2005 and he has never been compelled to ﬁne any resident for a violation.

Orbiter Dictum

The Law

10.As with most applications to determine whether the Act applies to such communities as mobile home parks such as the present application, the inquiry tums on the application of the exception to the Acts jurisdiction in subsection 5(a): This Act does not apply with respect to. (a) living accommodation intended to be provided to the travelling or vacationing public
or occupied tor e seasonal or temporary period in a hotel, motel or motor hotel, resort, lodge, tourist camp, cottage or cabin establishment inn, campground, trailer
park, tourist home. bed and breakfast vacation establishment or vacation home;

There are multiple reasons why the rule 5(a) exclusion cannot be applied here(Clearly ignored by the LTB Member)

1) From the Putnam and Mathews : The listing of places where this seasonal or temporary accommodation is to take place clearly is a listing of places, owned by private persons or businesses, which appeal to the general public as vacation spots or places to stay when one is away from home. They represent accommodation for travellers, for vacationers, for anyone who needs temporary accommodation provided by someone other than themselves.

The Tribunal accepts that the phrase “in a . . . cottage or cabin establishment” in Section 3(a) should be interpreted to mean that the grouping of cottages or cabins (the establishment) available as seasonal or temporary accommodation is analogous to the rooms in a hotel or a motel, or the rooms in a “bed and breakfast” or in an inn, or the sites at a campground or in a trailer park, available as living accommodation to be occupied for a seasonal or temporary period. To interpret otherwise would be to “hive off” this particular phrase from the listing in Section 3(a) and give it a completely different interpretation from the other words and phrases in the listing. Similarly, the accommodation in this case was not akin to the hotel, resort, campground or vacation home temporary lodgings that the legislature intended to exclude from the application of the Act.

11.The above wording has remained substantially unchanged from the two predecessor statutes, the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1990 and the Tenant Protection Act, 1997 (the ‘T.PA.’) both as amended.

Interesting Facts but has no relative bearing on the application of the RTA

12.The Courts‘ analysis with regard to the application of subsection 5(a) and its predecessor exemptions has shitted over time and crystallized with the Ontario Court of Appeal‘s decision in Algoma. However, even in earlier decisions, the analysis centered on the actual contract between the parties, rather than any conduct that existed contrary to that agreement.

Forget earlier decisions. Putnam and Mathews made it clear that the exclusion rule 5(a) did not apply to land lease homes.
The fact that in Mathews, the tenant was using a cottage is immaterial, the reference in the decision is that the cottage was a land lease home and thus the RTA did apply.

(3)(1) This Act, except Part V.1, applies with respect to rental units in residential complexes, despite any other Act and despite any agreement or waiver to the contrary. 2013, c. 3, s. 22 (1).

13. In earlier decisions, the Courts focused primarily on the “travelling or vacationing public’ aspect of the exemption. For instance, in McConnick v. Paul Bunyan Trailer Camp Ltd.’, the Superior Court of Justice conﬁmied the then Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal’s (the Tribunal’) decision that the T.P.A. did not apply to the residents because they did not live in the camp twelve months of the year and their trailer homes did not constitute mobile homes. The Tribunal deﬁned trailers and trailer parks through reference to CSA standards for mobile homes. The residents had entered a contractual arrangement with the respondent Camp pursuant to which they were entitled to reside at the trailer camp from Easter to Thanksgiving each year. All of the residents inhabited trailers as opposed to mobile homes as those terms were understood under the CSA standards. The trailers did not have water and sewage systems that could operate year-round. ( Park Model Trailer and Residential Unit by Definition) In other words, the case turned on where the residents lived versus where they spent their vacations. The Court found that they vacationed rather than resided at the respondents camp. interpretation that included an analysis of the Act or its purpose.

The definition in the RTA is the one that should have been used here. This obviously did not meet the needs of the member.

“mobile home” means a dwelling that is designed to be made mobile and that is being used as a permanent residence;

14. in Rogers v. Fisherrnans Cove Tent & Trailer Park Ltd.’, the Superior Court agreed with the Tribunal Member that the T.P.A. did not apply. The Tribunal member found as a fact:
a. that the Tenants did not live in the unit as a permanent residence. Rather, they used the unit as a seasonal or temporary residence;

(Error in Law – Subsection 3(a) did not define Fisherman’s Cove as a Campground. )

15. The Appellants argued, however, that the Tribunal erred in law in failing to consider the intention of the parties – particularly the Rogers – with respect to occupation for seasonal or temporary periods. The Court disagreed, holding: To interpret section 3(a) in the fashion urged on us by the Appellants would entail incorporating the words ‘intended to be‘ before the words ‘occupied for a seasonal or temporary period‘ in the provision. We do not read the provision in that fashion. in our view section 3(a) should be read as dealing with ‘living accommodation intended to be provided to the traveling or vacationing public and “living accormmodation occupied for a seasonal temporary period. The later focus is a focus on the fact of occupation rather than on the fact of intention to occupy [Emphasis added].

An LTB Interpretation of Rule 5(a) that was contrary to that in both Putnam and Mathews and if allowed to stand, any landlord of a permanent year round park can claim exclusions for any site rented by Snowbirds that go south for a few of the winter months. The intent of the legislators here is that permanent land lease homes would be covered by the RTA. Two reasons to view the rule this way are (1) the Site (By RTA Definition is equated to the living accommodation, is occupied all year(Perennial) by the Park Model Trailer) and (2) from Putnam & Mathews: The living accommodations must be supplied by the park to meet the exclusion criteria)

“rental unit” means any living accommodation used or intended for use as rented residential premises, and “rental unit” includes,
(a) a site for a mobile home or site on which there is a land lease home used or intended for use as rented residential premises

From Putnam v Grand River Conservation Authority: The listing of places where this seasonal or temporary accommodation is to take place clearly is a listing of places, owned by private persons or businesses, which appeal to the general public as vacation spots or places to stay when one is away from home. They represent accommodation for travelers, for vacationers, for anyone who needs temporary accommodation provided by someone other than themselves.

Also

Termium Plus, the Canadian Governments Terminology Database defines campground/Campsite as An area which provides a tent site or a trailer space for campers, and which may be equipped with a picnic table and a fire ring.

A Trailer Park is defined as [A campground] equipped with running water, electricity, and other facilities, for accommodating automobile trailers.

16. in Hadfow v. M.S. V. Holdings. the Tribunal considered the question of whether adding permanent additions to their trailer changed the nature of the relationship between the parties and thereby afford the residents the protections of the T.P.A.‘ As the Member stated: I shall set out law later that just by a tenant unilaterally physically changing an area rented it does not change the lease arrangement of the area. So by making a trailer look more like a mobile home to thus try to squeeze the structure into the definition of mobile home under the TPA this does not change the relationship between the Landlord and the Tenant Nor if the outside looks are changed of the unit so it looks similar to a mobile home the relationship does not change.

MPAC is most interested in physical changes to the unit, that changes its status from mobile to permanent, especially if a sun room is added. A permanent mobile home or land lease home is subject to Residential Taxes.

18. In SOT-01217, dated October 8, 2008, the Member found the following among other factors, with regard to the residence in that application:
a. It was used temporarily and not permanently; Not applicable see notes above
b. The parties agreed that the rental unit was not a mobile home; Fits the RTA definition of a land lease home.
c. The residential address given by the Tenants was that of their home in Toronto. Not applicable see notes above
19.The Member found that there was no intention by either party that the rental unit would be used as the Tenants’ sole, principal or permanent residence. As in McCormick. where a trailer was to be used only seasonally. it will be exempt from the Act.

20 As mentioned above, the legal analysis of exemption under subsection 5(a) was reﬁned by the Court of Appeal in their decision in Algoma. in that case, the applicants each leased land from the respondents predecessor and erected cottages which they used as year round second homes. When the respondent acquired the land, it sent eviction notices to some lessees and gave notices of significant rent increases to others. lt also purported to replace the leases with licenses which gave it an unfettered discretion whether to renew the license upon its annual expiration. The applicants brought an application for a determination that the Act applied to their land lease community. The Landlord and Tenant Board (the ‘Board’) dismissed the application. The Divisional Court dismissed the applicants’ appeal. holding that the premises in question were not ‘residential’ because they were used for recreational purposes. The applicants appealed.

From Mathews v Algoma Timberlake : The purpose of the legislation is to provide protections to tenants. There is no reason to exclude tenants who have a penchant for recreation and spending time with their families in the outdoors. Indeed, if it had been the legislature’s intention to exclude recreational units from the Act, it could have added living accommodation occupied for “recreational” purposes to the s. 5 list of premises to which the Act does not apply.

21 in its decision. the Court of Appeal ended the distinction between vacation and residential property, but again focused on the contractual intent of the parties. The Court held that all residential properties, including those used by tenants for recreational as well as residential purposes, are subject to the Act. The cottages in question were ‘living accommodations‘ used or intended for use as ‘rented residential premises.’ Occupants of residential units are entitled to the protection of the Act, what ever they do inside or outside of their premises during their waking hours and regardless of whether they live in the accommodation 52 weeks a year or some lesser amount of time, or whether the unit in question is their primary or secondary residence. The Court ultimately held that the Act applied to the cottages in question.

This is an LTB interpretation as the actual decision stated that the Cottages were a land lease home and thus the act did apply.

22 l find that the fact scenario in Algoma is distinguishable from the present facts. The recreational leases in Algoma with a twenty year less a day lease with a renewable term of one year.

Land Lease Homes typically are perennial and have a one year lease renewed annually, many tenants having been on their site for over 20 years. However there is no reference to the lease period in the RTA

Also, the evidence established that the leases were intended to be continually renewed over a long period of time. All of the leases provided for payment of rent on an annual basis .Again Typical payment arrangements for a Land Lease Home in a Land Lease Community

The Court noted that the cottages in AIgoma were “built for the long term to be used all year‘ and that most of the cottages were insulated . and heated for winter use. Photographs of the appellants cottages showed they were largely carefully constructed dwellings of signiﬁcant substance. (Immaterial – No relation to anything in the RTA)

23 Most importantly, unlike the present situation. in Algoma, the Landlord never contractually restricted access, seasonally or otherwise. Other factors as summarized by the Court demonstrated that the fact situation in Algoma was completely contrary to the present application: (Immaterial – No relation to anything in the RTA)

From the RTA

(3)(1) This Act, except Part V.1, applies with respect to rental units in residential complexes, despite any other Act and despite any agreement or waiver to the contrary. 2013, c. 3, s. 22 (1).

(3) In interpreting a provision of this Act with regard to a mobile home park or a land lease community, if a provision in Part X conflicts with a provision in another Part of this Act, the provision in Part X applies. 2006, c. 17, s. 3

24. The Court ultimately found that the accommodation in Algoma was not akin to the hotel, resort, campground or vacation home temporary lodgings that the legislature intended to exclude from the application of the Act.‘

Land Lease homes fall under this rule as well, as the Cottages were defined as a land lease home in Mathews
The Court held that all residential properties, including those used by tenants for recreational as well as residential purposes, are subject to the Act. The cottages in question were ‘living accommodations‘ used or intended for use as ‘rented residential premises.

For these reasons, I would allow the appeal, set aside the orders below and issue a declaration that the Act applies to the land lease sites occupied by the appellants

25.This emphasis on the contractual intentions of the parties continued in Board decisions such as SWT-10443-10, dated September 16, 2010. in that case, the Member found that the Act did not apply to the residence due to the following factors:
a. The applicants‘ trailer was not their permanent residence. As the time of the hearing, they also resided permanently in Bayfield, Ontario and also in Florida.

b. The parties entered into a contractual arrangement, in which the applicants were entitled to occupy their trailer from about May 1 to October 31 each year.

From Mathews v Algoma Timberlake: “Occupants of residential units are entitled to the protection of the Act, whatever they do inside or outside of their premises during their waking hours and regardless of whether they live in the accommodation 52 weeks a year or some lesser amount of time, or whether the unit in question is their primary or secondary residence.
26.These same factors apply to the present case as the Applicant must vacate the unit to his permanent residence during a similar closed season when he is contractually prohibited from residing in his trailer.

From Putnam: 2. (1) This Act applies with respect to rental units and residential complexes, despite any other Act and despite any agreement or waiver to the contrary.
27.Similarly, in CET-18301-11-RV, dated September 19, 2012, the reviewing Member cited a seasonal restriction as in the present case to distinguish that living accommodation from that in Algoma. Focusing on the contractual intent of the parties, the reviewing Member noted that in GET-18301-11-RV, ‘occupancy was speciﬁcally prohibited between October 15 and the opening of the park in springtime and was meant for ‘recreational vacation purposes.” The reviewing Member therefore concluded that the exemption in subsection 5(a) of the Act applied as the park provided to the ‘vacationing public‘ and was “occupied for a seasonal or temporary period‘ in a “trailer park.‘ In the present case, the By-Laws also prohibit occupation during the closed season.

See Notes on Item 15

From Putnam: 2. (1) This Act applies with respect to rental units and residential complexes, despite any other Act and despite any agreement or waiver to the contrary.
28.The issue of breaching a condition of the contract was addressed in NOL-11123-13, dated November 7, 2013. The Landlord in that case required that if residents intended to reside in their units during the winter season, they must check in with the management upon arrival. The Member found that this notiﬁcation term in the contract imposed ‘an important condition precedent to mutually intended year-round occupation.‘ As the resident did not contest the Landlord’s evidence that she failed to notify the Landlord of her arrival prior to winter occupation. the Member found that the condition precedent had not been satisfied and that the living accommodation was exempt from the act pursuant to subsection 5(a) of the Act.

Not relevant to the RTA
29. Lastly, both parties relied on Superior Court’s decision in Leduc v. Glen Echo Park Inc.° The Applicant stressed that this case stood for the principle that there could be a vast difference between the terms of the contract and what actually occurred in practice within a residential complex. Leduc was an appeal by the tenants from a decision of the Board’s decision ﬁnding that they had no residential tenancy relationship with the respondents. The respondents operated a nudist camp. The appellants were members of the camp and had paid an additional fee in order to erect structures on the land. ln 2009, when the property was sold, they were asked to leave. They argued that this constituted an eviction and that their security of tenure and other rights as residential tenants had been violated.
The Board detemiined that the Act did not apply because the property in question was not the subject of a residential tenancy.

Not relevant to this case
30.While the Board Member noted that some of the structures were solid, afﬁxed to the ground and described as permanent. he held that the permanency of the structures was not an issue for him; rather it was whether they were residential.

Error in law. The RTA is specifically interrested in the permancy of the structure and the residential aspect is immaterial
31 . The Board found that the ofﬁcial policy of the camp was that no one was to stay over the winter and that the owner closed down water and other communal facilities in the campground areas, but that nonetheless some people did stay in their dwellings through the winter.
32.The Board found that the living arrangements in the park bore little resemblance to a residential tenancy. He found that fees were paid for membership in the park and that members could and some did pay an additional fee for the privilege of erecting a shelter that was supposed to be temporary. Members had to pay a fee for any guests. G.S.T. was charged on all fees, which is not applicable to rent.‘°

Appeals court: The Court held that all residential properties, including those used by tenants for recreational as well as residential purposes, are subject to the Act.

33. Ultimately, Leduc, like the other cases submitted, demonstrates that the proper analysis to determine whether the Act applies to living accommodations such as in the present applition necessitates a close examination of the intent of the parties as illustrated in the contract that exists between them. While the residents in Leduc strayed from the terms of their agreement with the owner, the terms of their contract revealed a living arrangement highly dissimilar to that of a landlord and tenant relationship. It was the preponderance of these differences rather than the residents’ actions in erecting permanent structures that exempted them from the Act. In addition, although the residents stayed the winter, they were not authorized to do so. Whether or not the management chose to enforce the terms of the contract does not negate the existence of the prohibition.

From Putnam: 2. (1) This Act applies with respect to rental units and residential complexes, despite any other Act and despite any agreement or waiver to the contrary.
Analysis
34.The Applicant took the position at the present hearing that the relationship between the parties should be construed as a Landlord-Tenant relationship as it is physically possible for the Applicant to reside in the unit through the year, but for the Respondent’s policy prohibiting year round use. While the Applicant’s Legal Representative characterized the residence as a permanent structure, I do not ﬁnd that the evidence presented at the hearing supports this view. The Applicant referred to the trailer as a “park model‘ and did not provide evidence of any additions to the trailer itself that rendered the structure as permanent, beyond the removal of the trailers immediate capacity to be moved.

Why is this member adjudicating in an area where he is not familiar with the subject at hand? Tribunal Members are supposed to be experts in the field in which they are adjudicating.

Obviously the member had no concept of what a Park Model Trailer is. A Park Model Trailer has wheels and a tow bar only for the purpose of moving the trailer to a site where its is permenantly mounted. Park model trailers are NOT towed arround for traveling or vacation purposes. Some park model trailers are too wide to be moved on public roads without a special permit.

Typically a Park Model Trailer has no holding tanks for fresh water or sewage, Travel Trailers do have holding tanks.

Park Model Trailers may have Tip Outs, where travel trailers have Slide Outs. Tip outs do not seal when retracted, where slide outs do seal for traveling

From Termium Plus: Park Model Trailer: Park model. This is a standard travel trailer that is not self-contained. It is designed for park camping only, and while it is easily moved from site to site, as a normal trailer is, it is not capable of “dry camping” as it does not have any water storage tanks and must be used with hookups. It is not a mobile home.

35. However, whether or not the Applicant added or altered the trailer to become semi-permanent in nature is not material to whether the unit is a seasonal residence. The intent of the parties was that the park may not be used as a year round permanent residence. Simply because it is theoretically possible to violate this contract does not in any way invalidate it. ln other words, although I ﬁnd it would be possible for the Applicant to stow away in his trailer and survive the winter all the while evading park security, I do not ﬁnd that such a breach of his contract would change the relationship between the parties or thereby confer on him protection under the Act.

From Mathews v Algoma Timberlake: “Occupants of residential units are entitled to the protection of the Act, whatever they do inside or outside of their premises during their waking hours and regardless of whether they live in the accommodation 52 weeks a year or some lesser amount of time, or whether the unit in question is their primary or secondary residence.
36.The contract signed by the parties explicitly states the temporary and seasonal nature of the residential complex, speciﬁcally that: The Camper shall not use the Campsite as a principal, permanent, year-round or full-time residence, and shell close and vacate the unit on the Campsite for a minimum of sixty (60) consecutive days annually between October 31 and the following April 30

From Putnam: 2. (1) This Act applies with respect to rental units and residential complexes, despite any other Act and despite any agreement or waiver to the contrary.

37. In light of all of the evidence before me, I ﬁnd that the residential complex is intended to be provided to the travelling or vacationing public or occupied for a seasonal or temporary period, and as a result, exempted from the Act, pursuant to subsection 5(a) of the Act.
The Act therefore does not apply.

There is a single thread running through this decision, that relies heavily on rule 5(a) and it aspect of seasonal, and temporary period. Both the Mathews and Putnam appeals removed 5(a) from the equation as pertains to land lease homes, as they are NOT provided by the campground. The LTB seems to have discounted this rule as it is the only one where they can rule in favour of the RTA not being applied to the detriment of the tenant that they are obligated to protect

The listing of places where this seasonal or temporary accommodation is to take place clearly is a listing of places, owned by private persons or businesses, which appeal to the general public as vacation spots or places to stay when one is away from home. They represent accommodation for travellers, for vacationers, for anyone who needs temporary accommodation provided by someone other than themselves.

Also

The facility in question here is a land lease home in a land lease community, and does not fall under the classification of campground or trailer park

Also

The tenant owned land lease home(perennial) occupies the Site year round, not for a temporary period of time.

It is blatantly obvious, from the information provided throughout this document, that the member did not have the best interest of the Tenant in mind (as mandated by the RTA) when he made this decision. Several items of his decision were contrary to plainly outlined rules in the RTA and Decisions of previous appeal courts.

More Comments available in Six Reasons Why the Exclusion Rule 5(a) is not applicable to a Land Lease Home.